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Abstract
The issue of whether to establish Specialist Chambers within the Kosovo justice system 
for alleged war crimes committed in Kosovo has been, arguably, one of the most 
heated debates not only from a political and social point of view, but also from a legal 
one. While the required amendments in the Constitution and several laws of Kosovo 
necessary to establish the Specialist Chambers in furtherance of the agreement dated 
14 April 2014 between the Republic of Kosovo and the European Union on the Mission 
of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (“EULEX”)1 will certainly create 
heated debates in the political level, one may argue that the legal issues that are 
expected to be encountered when the Specialist Chambers will be operational, may 
be even more pressing. This is in consideration of the peculiar nature of the Specialist 
Chambers, which are meant to have their basis within the laws of Kosovo, but at the 
same time, be independent from them and from control of Kosovo authorities. The 
purpose of this article is to delineate the possible legal issues that might confront the 
Specialist Chambers of Kosovo. Its main argument is that, while the Specialist Chambers 
seem to follow the experience of other hybrid internationalised courts, it still differs 
from them in some aspects. The challenges that the new Specialist Chambers may 
need to tackle deal with its jurisdiction and position within the Kosovo Judicial system, 
and its legitimacy and legal basis. 
Keywords: Kosovo Specialist Chambers; international criminal law; jurisdiction; hybrid 
tribunals; Marty Report
Introduction
The establishment of Specialist Chambers within the Kosovo judicial system will 
certainly be a major challenge from both a political and legal perspective. Nevertheless, 
the focus of this article will rely on the latter, that is, the legal issues that may be 
encountered during the establishment and work the Specialist Chambers. The process 
of setting up ad hoc international or internationalised courts or tribunals is certainly 
not new in the practice of post-conflict societies. However, this article argues that, 
despite having elements in common with these previous practices, the new Specialist 
Chambers will be a departure from the model followed by hybrid courts, because 
1 Law no. 2014/04-L-274, passed in Parliament on 23.04.2014, and promulgated with Presidential Decree of the President of the 
Republic of Kosovo no. DL-022-2014, dated 07.05.2014.
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the Specialist Chambers will apply mostly domestic law and will be incorporated in 
the domestic judicial system, despite the fact that it will remain independent from 
the Kosovo judiciary. Additionally, the article raises doubts as to the jurisdiction of 
the Specialist Chambers, whether they would have they would need their own legal 
personality in order to operate such independently from the Kosovo judicial system 
and its authorities.  The first part will deal with the experience of other sibling hybrid 
courts in other countries, by underlining the similarities and differences in order to 
benefit from best practice experiences abroad. The second part will examine the 
proposal for a specialist court to investigate and prosecute allegations raised in the 
report of Senator Dick Marty. The last part will focus on the jurisdiction of the Specialist 
Court vis-à-vis Kosovo’s domestic law and international law.
Previous experiences of hybrid internationalised courts.
Generations of the International Criminal Courts and Tribunals 
The debate over the proliferation of international or internationalised (hybrid) courts 
and tribunals is not at all new within international law scholars, and in particular, 
international criminal law scholars.2 In international criminal law, hybrid courts and 
tribunals are classified as third generation of tribunals which are mandated to try 
international crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
Briefly speaking, the first generation consists of courts established by the Allied Powers3 
immediately after the end of WWII, in order investigate and prosecute politicians and 
high ranking Nazi officials for their role in the commission of crimes by the Nazis during 
the war period. Keeping into consideration the previous failures of the international 
community to prosecute and convict persons responsible for the commission of war 
crimes during WWI, the Allied Powers decided to establish, in 1945 the International 
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, (for Nazi war criminals) and the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) in Tokyo (for the Japanese ones). The jurisdiction given 
to these ad hoc tribunals by international treaty was to try three types of international 
2 Since 15 years ago, the NYU Journal of International Law and Politics devoted a special issue (Vol 31, no. 4, 1999) debating 
possible benefits and consequences of the increase of the number of international courts and tribunals, not only in international 
criminal law, but also on the law of the sea, or international trade law, (such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea, or the Dispute Settlement Board of the World Trade Organization (WTO)), which reminds the concept of fragmentation in 
international law, with self-contained regimes that have their own special principles and rules, applicable only to certain specific 
fields in international law.
3 United States, France, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.
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crimes: crimes against peace,4 war crimes,5 and crimes against humanity6 (the term 
genocide was unknown at the time. It was only later coined by Polish-Jewish lawyer 
Raphael Lemkin). Although the experience of these military tribunals marked a clear 
turn against the impunity of crimes of an international character, by giving a strong 
signal that the international community will not stand indifferent to these events, they 
were ultimately seen still seen (probably also due to the lack of a proper due process) 
as a victor’s justice, thus reducing their legitimacy. 
The second generation of international criminal tribunals were established almost 
fifty years after, where following the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council 
established, based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993 and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwuanda (ICTR) in 1994, as a response of the international community for the war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocides committed in the Balkans during the 
Bosnian conflicts and in Rwanda, where the “Hutu” majority exterminated within a 
three months period over half a million “Tutsi” civilians. As the international military 
tribunals of the aftermath of WWII, the UN international criminal tribunals were of an 
ad hoc character, thus limited in time and in relation to a specific event, in a specific time 
and place. However, unlike the international military tribunals, that were considered 
as a ‘victor’s justice’, the ICTY and ICTY have by now created a rich jurisprudence on 
various issues of international criminal law and international humanitarian law, by 
establishing a high standard of due process of law, in full respect of the rights of the 
accused,7 despite the fact that these tribunals are not, per se, obliged to follow the 
jurisprudence of human rights courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights, or 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Moreover, one may assert that this goal to 
maintain the highest standard for a fair trial may have been a factor in the prolonged 
duration of these trials for several years, by creating a perception in the public of a 
slow justice. As for their legitimacy, it may be worth here to explain two concepts: the 
legal one with regard the legal basis of their establishment; and the one concerning 
public perception, especially from the affected communities in the conflicts.
With regard to the legal legitimacy of the legal source of the creation of these 
international criminal tribunals, the first debates were focused on whether, the UN 
4 Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
5 Violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation 
to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of 
war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or 
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity
6 Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before 
or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
7 Wolfgang Schomburg, ‘The Role of International Criminal Tribunals in Promoting Respect for Fair Trial Rights’, 8 Northwestern 
Journal of International Human Rights (2009). 
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Security Council, as a clearly political organ, was competent to establish judicial 
organs to investigate and try the most highly responsible persons in the commission 
of international crimes. This issue was tackled by the ICTY in its first case, Prosecutor 
v. Duško Tadić. 8 In an interlocutory decision, the Appeals Chamber explained – in 
simple words – that since the UN Security Council was competent to authorise armed 
intervention according to article 42 of the UN Charter, then there was nothing to 
suggest that the Council could not, acting on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter 
(resolution binding to all UN members states), to also establish judicial organs, and 
action that, per se, could be classified in those of the envisaged by article 41 of the 
UN Charter.
However, in relation to the ‘public’s legitimacy’, these tribunals suffered from the fact 
that their seats were located far away from the “crime scene” (the ICTY is located in 
the Hague, Netherlands, while the ICTY in Arusha, Tanzania); their staff and judges are 
internationally recruited; and the applicable law is international law. These features, 
coupled with the fact that trials were slow, (in fact because of the complexity of the 
cases), created the perception of a “foreign” court to local communities, both to war 
victims and to those communities that were considered as ‘aggressors’ and that always 
considered the tribunals as victor’s justice.
As for the International Criminal Court (ICC), it can be classified at the same category 
with the ad hoc tribunals for the fact that it is a court entirely with international 
elements, with jurisdiction to investigate and try international crimes (committed 
after the date of the entry into force of its constituent instrument, the Rome Treaty) 
and for crimes committed within its member states or ratione personae by persons 
having the nationality of its member states; and in special cases, when a third state 
accepts the jurisdiction of the Court,9 or when the situation is referred by the UN 
Security Council.10
The Court International Criminal undoubtedly constitutes the future of international 
criminal law, since it the only permanent court with the treaty basis and not related to 
the UN. However, the International Criminal Court suffers from the same critiques that 
were directed to the ad hoc tribunals due to the distance in location from the countries 
where the case or situation is being investigated, as well as the tendency (certainly 
not because of the Court’s fault) to start investigations only for crimes committed in 
African countries.
8 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 2 October 1995. 
9 For example, the situations in Mali and Ivory Coast, accessible in http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20
cases/situations/icc0112/Pages/situation%20index.aspx  and http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/FF9939C2-8E97-4463-934C-
BC8F351BA013/279779/ICDE1.pdf. 
10 For example, situations in Libya or Darfur, Sudan. 
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The third generation of international criminal courts and tribunals, composed by hybrid 
tribunals, were conceived precisely to overcome the abovementioned drawbacks. 
Thus, a common element of hybrid courts and tribunals, is the mix of the high standard 
and impartiality of international resources, coupled with the specificities and local 
considerations of the state where the crimes have occurred. The aim is twofold here. 
On the one hand, the focus is on increasing the legitimacy of the court or tribunal 
for the affected communities by including local judges in the judicial panels and by 
applying the domestic legislation in parallel with international law. On the other hand, 
it avoids sham trials from the “victorious” party, and increases the guarantees for 
impartiality in the process of adjudication from judges who have no personal interest 
or conflict of interest in the relevant case. 
Special Court for Sierra Leone
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was established in 2002 as a result of an 
international agreement between the UN and the goverment of Sierra Leone, 
following a request from the latter. The SCSL may be considered as the first hybrid 
court of a national and international character, set up by a bilateral agreement 
between a state and an international organization as the UN, by creating a separate 
international organization, with its own legal personality, that the is SCSL. According 
to its Statute (nowadays in the process of closing with the Residual Mechanism of 
the SCSL), the SCSL had the power to the power to prosecute persons who bear the 
greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and 
Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 
1996 (following the failure of the Lomé Agreement). The SCSL was composed of local 
and international judges, the latter being a majority. As with regard to the Office of 
the Prosecutor, the Statute stipulated that the Prosecutor would be an international 
official, while the Deputy Prosecutor would be local. In the meanwhile, the seat of 
the court was located in Sierra Leone and in the Netherland, for more sensitive and 
important cases, as for example the one concerning the former President of Liberia, 
Charles Taylor. 
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)
As with Sierra Leone’s case, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
were established as a consequence of an international agreement between the 
government of Cambodia and the UN, represented by the Secretary General (mandated 
by the UN Security Council to negotiate the agreement). The ECCC’s mandate is to 
investigate the persons responsible for the genocide, murders and tortures caused 
by the Kmer Rouge regime from 17 April 1975 until 6 January 1979 where at least 1.7 
million people are believed to have died from starvation, torture, execution and forced 
labour. Although initially the UN expert group mandated with the task of setting up 
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such a court recommended that the court be under international control, this was 
rejected by Cambodian authorities,11 arguing that the newly court must remain within 
the Cambodian judicial system. Thus, just like the SCSL, the ECCC is to be considered 
as a hybrid court due to the composition of its judicial panels, the office of the 
prosecutor and the court’s staff, the seat of the court, and because of the application 
of domestic criminal law, mixed with international law elements. Unlike the SCSL, the 
ECCC is an integral part of the Cambodian judicial system, and the participation of the 
international staff is only considered as an ‘assistance’ of the international community 
from a logistic, financial and international standards of fair trials aspect. 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL)
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) is a unique case in the family of international 
hybrid courts, because it was set up as a consequence of the even of 14 February 2005 
in which a powerful explosion in central Beirut took the lives of 23 people, including 
former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri. Following a request of the Lebanese 
government, the UN Security Council mandated the UN Secretary General to negotiate 
the establishment of an independent court to investigate and prosecute the terrorist 
act of 14 February 2005, following the example of the Special Court of Sierra Leone. 
Such an agreement between the Lebanese government and the UN was signed on 23 
January 2007. However, due to internal political strife, this agreement was not ratified 
by the Lebanese Parliament. Thus, in an almost unprecedented move, the Security 
Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, passed Resolution 1757 (2007),12 
deciding to give legal effect to the contents of the annex to the agreement containing 
the Statute of the Special Tribunal Lebanon. This action did not pass without debate 
not only in the doctrine, but also at the Special Tribunal itself by the defense in the case 
of Ayyash et al, who opposed the jurisdiction and legality of the Tribunal. As expected, 
the Trial Chamber dismissed the challenge of the Defence by a decision on 27 July 
201213 holding that (i) the only legal basis for the establishment of the Special Tribunal 
in Lebanon was Resolution 1757 (2007) and not the agreement dated 23 January 2007, 
which was never ratified; and that (ii) the Trial Chamber did not have the authority to 
assess the “legality” of  a Security Council decision-making. This holding was upheld 
by the Appeals Chamber,14 which re-confirmed that
11 Suzannah Linton, “Cambodia, East Timor And Sierra Leone: Experiments In International Justice”, 12 Criminal Law Forum, 185-
246, 2001
12 Security Council, S/RES/1757 (2007).
13 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al, Case No. STL-11-01/PT/TC, “Decision On The Defence Challenges To The Jurisdiction And Legality 
Of The Tribunal” 27 July 2012.
14 STL, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al, Case No. STL-11-01/PT/AC/AR90.1, “Decision on the Defence Appeal  Against the Trial Chamber’s 
“Decision On The Defence Challenges To The Jurisdiction And Legality Of The Tribunal”, 24 October 2012.
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Beyond that notion of self-restraint, however, here is nothing in the [UN] Charter that 
gives any of the other organs of the United Nations the power to review the Security 
Council’s actions. Attempts to introduce such powers of review for the ICJ-the principal 
judicial organ of the United Nations at the time the United Nations Charter was drafted 
were defeated. Indeed, the ICJ has categorically stated that it “does not possess powers 
of judicial review or appeal in respect of decisions taken by the United Nations organs 
concerned”. [...]In any event, this Tribunal’s authority as an independent institution 
created by the Security Council outside of the United Nations system must necessarily 
be much more limited than that of the ICJ.15
As for the structure of the STL, it is similar to other sibling international courts and 
tribunals. Its Chambers, be it Trial or Appellate, are composed by both international 
and Lebanese judges (with a majority of international judges); and with staff of the 
Office of the Prosecutor, the Registrar, and of the Defence composed by international 
and Lebanese staff. Considering the type of crime for which the Tribunal has been 
established, the applicable law is international law, mixed with domestic legislation. 
The Specialist Court for Kosovo. Continuation of Hybrid Courts?
The aim of establishing an ad hoc court
It may be superfluous to say that the sole aim of establishing a special court for 
Kosovo came as a result of the findings of the report of the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe, prepared by Senator Dick Marty in January 2011,16 which 
alleged the commitment of war crimes and organized crime by former KLA fighters, 
and especially trafficking of organs of Serbian soldiers in the territory of Kosovo and 
Albania. Although these allegations were not new, because were already mentioned 
by the former Prosecutor of the ICRT in her autobiography book,17 but rejected by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia itself,18 it was nevertheless 
decided by EULEX to give priority to the case, by creating the Special Investigative Task 
Force (SITF) in September 2011, a unit which was composed by EULEX international 
staff only.
After nearly three years of investigation, on 29 July 2014, the Chief Prosecutor of SITF, 
Mr. Clint Williamson issued a statement confirming, to some extent the consistency of 
the findings of senator Marty’s report, with the exception of claims of organ trafficking, 
15 Id, para 39.
16 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights Inhuman treatment of people and 
illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo, AS/Jur (2010) 46.
17 Carla del Ponte, La Caccia: Io e i Criminali di Guerra, Feltrinelli, (2008).
18 ICTY press release, 16 April 2008: “The Tribunal is aware of very serious allegations of human organ trafficking raised by the 
former Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, in a book recently published in Italian under her name. No evidence in support of such 
allegations was ever brought before the Tribunal’s judges. As I said, the allegations are extremely grave. It is up to the Prosecution 
to determine what information they may provide on this matter”. (accessible at http://www.icty.org/sid/9858) 
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which, according to the Chief Prosecutor ‘in order to prosecute such offences, however, 
it requires a level of evidence that we have not yet secured’.19 Nevertheless, Williamson 
left open the possibility to file an indictment for such crimes, should other evidence be 
found. In any case, even if such practices had been true, they were - contrary to what 
the Serbian authorities had claimed- on a very limited basis. According to the Chief 
Prosecutor Williamson: 
I can say at this point, that there are compelling indications that this practice did occur 
on a very limited scale and that a small number of individuals were killed for the purpose 
of extracting and trafficking their organs. This conclusion is consistent with what was 
stated in the Marty Report, namely that a “handful” of individuals were subjected to this 
crime. The use of the word “handful”by Senator Marty was intentional and it was meant 
literally. There is no indication at this point that this practice was widespread than that 
and certainly no indication that a significant portion of the ethnic minorities who went 
missing or were killed were victims of this practice. Statements that have been made by 
some implying that hundreds of people were killed for the purpose of organ trafficking 
are totally unsupported by the information we have and that Dick Marty had.20
In the meanwhile, with regard to the claims of crimes against humanity, the statement 
indicated that an indictment would be filed only after a specialist court would be 
established in the coming year. If that would have happened, then it was likely that 
the new Specialist prosecutor would file indictment for some former high officials of 
the KLA for acts of persecution that included unlawful killings, abductions, enforced 
disappearances, illegal detentions in camps in Kosovo and Albania, sexual violence, 
other forms of inhumane treatment, forced displacement, etc, which, according 
to SIFT, resulted in ‘the ethnic cleansing of large portions of the Serb and Roma 
populations from those areas in Kosovo south or the Ibar River, with the exception of 
a few scattered minority enclaves’.21
Without entering the merits of these accusations, the reliability of which will be 
decided by judicial authorities, it is worth to worthy to dwell somewhat on the 
consequences that are expected by the creation of a specialist court in the Kosovo 
and international communities, irrespective of whether the persons to be indicted will 
eventually be found guilty or not for war crimes or crimes against humanity. In fact, 
the creation of specialist court that will try former KLA members would be the first 
time where an ad hoc court would try only the (alleged) crimes of the party which was 
the “victim” in an armed conflict. For example, in the case of Rwanda, although there 
were enough evidence that the Tutsi rebels had committed war crimes and crimes 
against humanity after they gained control of the country, following the genocide from 
19  Statement of the Chief Prosecutor of the Special Investigative Task Force 29 July 2014, at 3 (accessible at http://sitf.eu/images/
Statement/Statement_of_the_Chief_Prosecutor_of_the_SITF_EN.pdf) 
20 Ibid, at 3. 
21 Ibid. at 2. 
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the Hutu communities,22 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda never indicted 
any Tutsi official. This was maybe not for pure legal reasons, and maybe due to socio-
political reasons, in order not to allow the moral ‘equity’ between aggressors and 
victims, or a possible generalization holding that both parties had “equally” committed 
international crimes. Likewise, the almost total bombing of Dresden, Germany from 
allied forces during WWII could easily be classified as a war crime, but no one was 
eventually accused for this fact. Of course, it is not my intention to justify any kind of war 
crime or crime against humanity that may have been committed by any KLA member. 
Ultimately, crimes are the same irrespective of political or nationality basis, and is 
equally heinous. Thus, whoever anyone that has committed crimes against humanity 
must be condemned without the slightest hesitation. But what might be problematic 
in the case of the Specialist court for Kosovo is the continuity of establishing an ad 
hoc tribunal especially for one party in the conflict (in case not the aggressor, but the 
victim) and the risk of putting KLA members in a similar position in the eyes of the 
general public international public with the murderous regime of Milosevic.
In order to avoid the abovementioned risk, the new court should be very careful in 
emphasizing that criminal responsibility is individual and not of an entire organization. 
According to authors such as Damasca, in international criminal law, the concept of 
“individualization” of the sentence is somewhat different from that understood by 
domestic criminal law system. If for the latter, the individualization is linked to the idea 
that punishment should be proportional to the individual responsibility, in international 
criminal law, individualization has the sole purpose to avoid collective responsibility.23 
This is based on the assumption that the conviction of some responsible persons will 
promote in the future the reconciliation between the affected communities, while 
their impunity will create the perception that all the relevant population, ethnic or 
religious group is responsible.24 In any case, it is questionable whether in practice 
the establishment of a specialist court for the events of the post 1999 war would 
avoid stigmatization of KLA by the international opinion, or whether will assist in the 
reconciliation between the states of Kosovo and Serbia. Experience has shown that 
such an important target has been nearly impossible for the UN ad hoc tribunals. 
The object of the judicial process is not to find historical truths, but only the find the 
individual criminal responsibility of the accused. Although the facts proven in a judicial 
processes are in itself, objective, and can be taken into consideration by historians, 
this still cannot be considered as the absolute truth, because the “procedural truth” 
always differs from the “real truth”. Perhaps it would have been more useful for the 
22 The Guardian, ‘Genocide tribunal 'ignoring Tutsi crimes', 13 January 2005, (accessible in  http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2005/jan/13/rwanda.rorycarroll).  
23 Mirjan R. Damaska, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’, 83 Chicago Kent Law Review, (2008), at 332.
24 Ibid, note 5.
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upcoming court to avoid the considerable expectations that might be asked of her, 
and to focus simply in trying the accused. 
The jurisdiction of the Specialist Court
The legal basis of the Specialist Court: International agreement or national law?
One of the first problems of the specialist court has to do with its jurisdiction. As 
admitted by the Chief Prosecutor of SITF Clint Williamson, this was the first time in 
international criminal law of a special prosecutor’s office with a mandate to investigate 
the events during the war and post-war but without the existence of a court where to 
file the indictment.25
Williamson was correct in stating that the ICTY could not investigate or prosecute the 
allegations of senator Dick Marty because the temporal jurisdiction of this Tribunal 
was exclusively for international crimes occurred during an armed conflict, that in 
Kosovo started by the end of May 1998 and ended in the middle of June 1999.26 In 
senator Marty’s report, the majority of these crimes belong to the post-war period, 
and therefore beyond the mandate of the ICTY. Moreover, one must not forget that the 
ICTY is closing its activities now and cannot accept new cases and that the International 
Criminal Court has jurisdiction only for international crimes occurred after 2002. For 
these reasons, the only solution was to have recourse to the legal authority of Kosovo 
itself. 
In the agreement (exchange of letters) of 14 April 2014 between the Republic of 
Kosovo and EULEX, is stipulated that is the investigation of the Special Investigative 
Task Force will conclude with an indictment, then the Republic of Kosovo assumes the 
responsibility of establishing specialist chambers and a special office of the prosecutor 
within its legal system to investigate and prosecute the findings of SITF. According to 
the agreement, the court will have its seat in Kosovo, but a special chamber will be 
set up for sensitive cases, in a host state (which might be the Netherlands). These 
structures will be administered by their own Statute and Rules of Procedure, including 
here the provisions for pardon, remand and sentencing outside Kosovo, in case of a 
guilty verdict. 
While in the case of hybrid courts and tribunals, the latter were established with 
international agreements, in the case of Kosovo, the legal basis of the specialist 
court will be domestic law, Kosovo’s Constitution and its laws. One must not make 
the mistake of thinking that the Agreement of 14 July 2014 between the Republic of 
Kosovo and EULEX was the legal basis of the specialist court. What the agreement 
stipulates, is the unilateral obligation of Kosovo to change its legislation, that in case 
25 Williamson Statement, 4. 
26 Prosecutor v. Vlastimir Dordevic, Case No. IT-05-87/1-T, 23.02.2011, page 629, Vol. 1, para. 1579. 
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of an indictment from SITF to establish specialist chambers inside its judicial system, 
and to delegate the implementation of these chambers to EULEX representatives. 
Therefore, the Court will not be established as a result of an international agreement, 
but unilaterally by the Kosovar authorities. This assertion is further backed by the fact 
that the host state agreement will not be concluded between the specialist court and 
the host state, but between Kosovo and the Host state. At this point, it is unknown 
how the Court may enter into an agreement with another state for the transfer of 
prisoners in the event of a possible conviction. Also, for the issue of international 
judicial cooperation, an essential element of international courts and tribunals is that 
they do not have a police force of their own. Thus such requests might have to pass 
through the Kosovo authorities, and not through the specialist chambers, which will 
be formally simply a special chamber within the judicial system of Kosovo, with no 
power to assume international obligations in the name and for the account of the 
Republic of Kosovo
The Specialist Court as an independent legal regime
Put briefly, the specialist court will be formally included within the judicial system in 
Kosovo, but will create a “system” of its own, with the rules and procedures typical of 
an international court, as well as its Criminal Code (the offenses within the jurisdiction 
of the court shall be provided in its Statute) and the Code of Criminal Procedure (which 
will consist of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence). In fact, as outlined above in 
connection with the cases of other hybrid courts, each of them had their Statute and 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of their own separate from those of the respective 
country in which the conflict occurred. This has come as a necessity of the functioning 
of a court with international judges and staff who may have different legal education 
in their countries, and to conduct effectively extremely complex trials. In this regard, 
the drafters of the Specialist Court will certainly benefit from the best practices of 
other international courts or internationalized ones, as well as their jurisprudence 
regarding the forms of liability in international criminal law.
However, prima facie, two issues deserve discussion in academic circles. First, it is 
striking that the Specialist Court will be the first hybrid court (thus included within 
the Kosovo judicial system), composed entirely of international staff selected from 
representatives of EULEX. As mentioned above, one of the main reasons for the 
success of hybrid courts relates to the combination of international and local staff, 
with local judges in the composition of the judicial panels, and the application both 
international and domestic law. This is because the presence of local personnel 
typically increases significantly the legitimacy of the court in the eyes of the concerned 
communities. While the choice to bypass Kosovar staff may have been justified to 
reduce the potential for leaking the identity of the protected witnesses, the absence 
from decision-making of from of Kosovar judges may prejudice the final outcome of 
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the Court as an independent justice, as well as lower the public confidence in the 
court. 
Secondly, with regard to the status and legitimacy of the delegation of judicial powers 
to EULEX judges and prosecutors of the specialist court, this will be carried out mutatis 
mutandis pursuant to the procedures of appointment of judges and prosecutors 
of EULEX, based on Article 20 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo which 
allows Kosovo to transfer, on the basis of ratified international agreements, certain 
competences to international organizations. However, the difference in this case is 
that while EULEX judges are involved and operate under the laws and institutions of 
Kosovo, in the case of the Specialist Court, the latter will not have any relation with the 
laws and institutions of Kosovo. Formally the Court will base its legitimacy and legal 
source on the Constitution and laws of Kosovo, but in practice it will operate outside 
its framework.
Types of criminal offences and forms of liability
The Statute of the Specialist Court (whose text was not public at the moment of 
writing this paper), is expected to provide the Court with competences to investigate 
and try international crimes (crimes against humanity, war crimes, or genocide), but 
also domestic law crimes, as envisioned by the Kosovo Criminal Code.27 Depending 
on the principle of the more favourable law is to be seen whether the Court will 
apply the criminal law of the time that was in force in 1999, or that later one, if it 
turns out more favourable in relation to the applicable law at the time in which the 
offense was committed. With regard to war crimes, it is easily understandable that 
jurisdiction ratione temporis extends to investigations up to the end of the period of 
armed conflict, which according to the ICTY, occurred in mid-June 1999.28 However, the 
specialist courts will not be obliged to follow the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals 
and may reach a different conclusion, and may reach a different conclusion regarding 
the period in which there was an armed conflict between Serbian forces on the one 
side and NATO forces and KLA’s on the other. While the ICTY has also jurisdiction to 
investigate war crimes during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, what was missing 
for the ICTY was the jurisdiction to adjudicate war crimes (allegedly) committed in the 
territory of Albania. With regard to crimes against humanity, it is worth recalling here 
that to try these crimes it is not required the presence of an armed conflict, but the 
existence of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the civilian population 
would suffice.29
27 It is worth mentioning that international crimes are also provided in much detail in the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kosovo 
in its Articles 150-153.
28 Supra, note 26.
29 Article 149 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo.
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Finally, it will be interesting what the choice of the Court in connection with the forms 
of individual criminal responsibility for international crimes will be. Unlike domestic 
criminal offences, international crimes, especially those against humanity, require 
to prove at trial the presence of a plan by a group of persons for widespread or 
systematic attack against the civilian population. Since the purpose for the creation 
of the Specialist Court is - like the other tribunals and international courts - the 
investigation of persons with greater responsibility, so the leading KLA members, then 
the process of proving the criminal responsibility for such persons in high positions will 
be not an easy task for the prosecution, since none of the accused persons may have 
personally committed any offense. At this point, the jurisprudence of international 
criminal tribunals and courts has been different from each other. While each of them 
has developed its jurisprudence separately from other courts, we can affirm that the 
two most important theories, in competition between them are: (i) the joint criminal 
enterprise (JCE - the three forms of it) developed first by the ICTY in the Tadić case30 
(this doctrine was accepted, with some modifications by most ad hoc tribunals), 
and the (ii) indirect co-perpetration, developed lately by the International Criminal 
Court. It remains to be seen that which of these two doctrines will be “chosen” by the 
Specialist Court for Kosovo. 
Conclusions
The debate on the establishment of a specialist court to investigate and prosecute 
allegations raised in the report of the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe, 
prepared by Senator Dick Marty is obviously in its early days and many other questions 
remain to be clarified. From a political side, the creation of the Specialist Court may be 
bad news, but also an opportunity. It is negative, as the stigma which may be created 
by years of trials of former KLA members can undermine the liberation struggle and 
sacrifices made for a free and independent Kosovo. But it may also be an opportunity, 
as it will forever eliminate the shadow of human organ trafficking allegations, and will 
accelerate Kosovo’s path towards European integration. Meanwhile, from a legal point 
of view, it is not entirely clear under which legal framework the specialist courts will 
operate; that is if we are dealing with a court based on an international agreement, or 
a court that operates exclusively within the limits of the judicial system in Kosovo, but 
also independent from it. In this case, it would be of interest for constitutional lawyers 
to investigate on how much can the Constitution and laws of Kosovo be changed in 
order to accommodate such a radical exclusion from the judicial model accepted by 
Kosovar citizens in the current Constitution. Finally, even if the above problems will 
be given exhaustive answers, the jurisprudence of the new Court will be essential, 
which on the one hand, is lucky to borrow the jurisprudence and best practices of 
30 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case no IT-94-1-A, 15.07.1999.
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other international and hybrid courts and tribunals, but on the other hand has a great 
responsibility to win the trust of the Kosovar community, by giving unbiased politically 
judgments, but rely only on the basis of the evidence admitted at trial.
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